- 131 - Pacific War - Siege of Myitkyina, May 21-28, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Last time we spoke about the battle of Wakde. Operation Tornado, the amphibious assault of Wakde island faced many logistical challenges, but not as much Japanese resistance. The landing at Arare was a large success, seeing the allies secure a beachhead before advancing inland. Through a combination of air, naval and ground attacks, the smaller Japanese force was pushed back. Likewise the islands of Liki and Niroemoar were taken with relative ease as well. Over in the Burma-India theater, the battle for Kohima was gradually seeing the Japanese fail to meet their objectives. Without ammunition or provision supplies flowing to them, the Japanese at Kohima had no hope of holding back the allies. Thus the Japanese were beginning to fall back and now were setting up a defense to stop the allies from entering central Burma. Meanwhile a siege was being erected against Myitkyina.

This episode is the Siege of Myitkyina

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Last time we saw General Stilwell had managed to seize the Myitkyina airstrip. Now allied forces were gradually securing northern Burma, pushing further towards Mogaung. The Japanese 18th Division were absolutely battered and barely holding on around Kamaing. However when the American-Chinese forces seized Myitkyina’s airstrip, they had failed to quickly attack the main town, which the Japanese were reinforcing heavily. Now they were being attacked from both ends. This prompted General Stilwell to dispatch General Boatner with the task force to try and turn things around. Simultaneously, Stilwell had just received word of the Chindits abandonment of the Blackpool stronghold, outraged by this he ordered them to advance northwards to support the attack on Mogaung.

Three brigades, the 111th, 14th and the 3rd West Africans were to advance north to support Calvert’s 77th Brigade to take Mogaung. The Chindits were incredulous. Nonetheless, Lentaigne, pressed by Stilwell, sought to have his 3rd West Africans, the 14th and 111th Brigades squeeze the Japanese along the western flanks of the Mogaung valley, in which Mogaung occupied the lowest point of an inverted triangle, with the other two points being Kamaing on the top left and Myitkyina on the top right. With any luck, his three brigades could capture Kamaing, which occupied an enviable place on the Mogaung River. The 111th Brigade was to move north-east and operate in the Pahok-Sahmaw area, destroying dumps and blocking enemy movement. Thebattered men of the 111th Brigade struggled to cope with the march north, to the hills east of Lakhren and west of Mogaung. Conditions were appalling on the three-day march to Lakhren village. From there, the best approach to Mogaung would be identified. They were making for a waterlogged, mosquito-infested area north east of the Lake. This area was also alive with Japanese units. They were required to support 77th Brigade’s attack on Mogaung, by pushing from the west as Calvert’s command advanced from the south-east. However, 111th Brigade was spent after Blackpool and many men were forced to return to Lakhren village. There was also a new task for 14th Brigade – the capture of Taungni. With the casualties evacuated, 14th Brigade abandoned the Kyunsalai Pass and headed north towards Mogaung. The steamy swamps continued to take their toll within the ranks of the York and Lancaster columns. Dysentery was rife. Animals collapsed and were shot where they dropped. They reached Mokso on June 25. This much-used rallying point, consisting of four huts, was a sea of mud and detritus, decorated with black clouds of flies. Rations were being consumed rapidly in an area devoid of drop zones. Brigadier Brodie, 14th Brigade’s Commander, responded to the extreme circumstances. His men, despite their dangerously poor condition, were still expected to harass the Japanese along the railway and support 77th Brigade’s assault on Mogaung. He formed his columns into “Light Battle Groups”, free of heavy weapons and the wounded and sick, now lying together in the mud. Meanwhile, some Nigerian units were now struggling on the road to Lakhren along the reailway, as were the York and Lancaster sick – around 300 in all, 200 of whom were dangerously ill.

On May 25th, the same day the Chindits had quit Blackpool, Stilwell ordered the Morris Force to seize Waingmaw, across the river from Myitkyina. Unfortunately, the Japanese had entrenched themselves at the town and enjoyed the luxury of a natural moat after heavy rains flooded the fields on the approaches to the town. Morrisforce was not a proper brigade, having only two columns of troops, to which a third from the 111th Brigade had been added 1,500 troops in total. It had been conceived to harass the Japanese on jungle areas. Now, they were up against fortified positions. The result was a bloodbath. Morrisforce then began to rapidly deplete in strength. By July 14th, it was to consist of exactly three platoons, roughly 120 men.

On May 31st, Boatner then launched his first coordinated attack against Myitkyina seeing the 42nd regiment reach the Waingmaw ferry road. Built up twelve feet above the neighboring paddy fields, the road gave the Japanese a magnificent defensive position, which they exploited cleverly. The Chinese recoiled from this natural fortification but were able to beat off a Japanese counterattack. The 150th Regiment reached the riverbank and drew up in an arc about a sawmill in which the Japanese had a strongpoint. Meanwhile Colonel Hunter’s 2nd battalion reinforced with engineers advanced to Radhapur where they were heavily counterattacked by the 114th Regiment. The next day, the inexperienced 236th Engineer Battalion was sent against Namkwi. The motive behind the 236th's attack was to contain the Japanese in the Namkwi area and introduce the battalion to combat under relatively easy conditions. One company of the 236th did succeed in entering Namkwi but instead of promptly consolidating to meet the inevitable Japanese counterattack fell out for a break. The Japanese counterattacked and drove the unwary engineers right back out of the village. Both the engineers and the 2600 replacements of the Galahad Unit that had recently arrived lacked adequate experience fighting the Japanese and as such suffered badly when fighting against them. Colonel Hunter’s veteran Marauders, however, had suffered ample casualties and thus needed these green replacements in order to continue existing as a fighting force. Boatner tossed a last ditch effort on June 3rd, but his Chinese forces had suffered 320 casualties and their ammunition was running low. While he waited for supplies to build up, he used his green american troops to give them some experience, the Chinese meanwhile tunneled towards the Japanese still suffering heavy casualties. This allowed more Japanese troops to break through and reinforce Myitkyina, with a huge relief force of the 52rd Division soon on its way.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Matsuyama Yuzo of the depleted 56th Division was facing a deadly offensive of his own on the Yunnan front. After a series of negotiations between Chiang Kai-Shek and the Americans, it had been agreed, General Wei Lihuang’s Y Force would cross the Salween River to attack the Tengchong and Longling areas. This would effectively allow the allies to link the Ledo Road with China, bypassing the heavy Japanese concentration along the Burma Road. Although the Americans had supplied the Y Force with artillery and ammunition, the Chinese had failed to bring the Y Force divisions up to strength, and many questioned their training. Regardless, General Wei planned to have elements of the 20th army group cross the Salween at several points before initiating a full assault against Tengchong once reinforcements had been ferried through. Further south, elements of the 11th Army Group would also cross the Salween to launch attacks on Pingda and Longling.

On the night of May 11th, the Chinese forces began to cross the Salween River against little Japanese resistance, since Matsuyama had decided not to defend the crossing sites, instead placing his main line of resistance along the ridge line some 10 miles west. The 198th Division was able to assemble in front of the Mamien Pass; the 36th division was successfully ferried through Mengka; the brand new 39th Division managed to secure the Hueijen bridge and the 76th and 88th Divisions were converging on Pingda for the attack. On May 12th, the 198th were making good progress against the Mamien Pass as the 36th had surrounded the Japanese outposts in the eastern end of the Tiantouzhai pass. However Colonel Kurashige Yasuyoshi had his 148th regiment launched two surprise night counterattacks. All that night, the Japanese quietly filtered down from a nearby ridge and assembled near the Chinese position. Attacking at dawn, they surprised the Chinese and almost wiped them out before aid came. When darkness came, the 36th were at their bivouac. That night, the Japanese attacked vigorously, overrunning the division command post and causing the flustered 36th Division to fall back to the Salween. At dawn, the 53rd Army commander, Maj. Gen. Chou Fu-cheng, pushed a regiment across the Salween and restored the situation by attacking the Japanese flank. General Chou was an aggressive and tenacious fighter, whom his Manchurian soldiers had nicknamed Old Board-Back, and who had the reputation of never having yielded an inch to the Japanese. But even Chou could not immediately restore the morale of the 36th Division, which for some weeks took no further part in the Ta-tang-tzu fighting, and the rest of the 53rd Army had to bear the burden of clearing the pass.

In response to this, Lt General Zhou Fucheng of the 53rd Army pushed the 116th and 130th Divisions across the river to resume the advance towards Tiantouzhai. At the Mamien pass, the 592nd and 594th Regiments began clearing out the Japanese strongpoints while the 593rd Regiment moved west over mountain byways to emerge into the Shweli valley by the 16th, securing the western end of the pass and forcing Kurashige’s men to withdraw into the fortified village of Shangzhaigongfang. To the south, the New 39th would be able to secure Hemushu by the 17th. Yet the Japanese under Colonel Matsui Hideji soon recovered from the initial surprise of the Chinese offensive and the 1st battalion, 113th regiment drove the Chinese from Hung-mu-shu. The Japanese exploited their success and pushed the entire New 39th Division back against the Salween.

Further south, the 76th Division met outposts of the 1st battalion, 146th regiment and forced them back to the heights overlooking Ping-ka. Meanwhile the 88th Division from the north was fighting through a series of fortified villages as it headed south to join the 76th Division. By the 16th, thirteen villages were occupied in the area northeast of Ping-ka, but the Japanese, as they withdrew, received reinforcements. Strengthened by the 2nd battalion, 113th regiment, the Japanese did not attack the Chinese who were pursuing them, but moved south and hit the Chinese 228th Regiment south and west of Ping-ka.

Sensing the imminent danger from the north, Matsuyama redirected the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 113th Regiment to reinforce Shangzhaigongfang, where Kurashige would continue to resist staunchly. Reports from the American liaison teams were not cheerful. Americans observing the Kaolikung Range actions found that Japanese fire was accurate and economical, and that the enemy's use of camouflage and concealment approached perfection. The Japanese revealed no disposition to surrender though they were heavily outnumbered, often surrounded, and had neither air support nor air supply. On the other hand, the Americans reported that the Chinese endlessly wasted manpower and ammunition in costly frontal attacks. They reported that relations with the Chinese were not always as friendly as had been hoped, and they believed there would have to be better cooperation between Chinese and Americans if the Japanese were to be defeated. The Chinese were described as merely tolerating the Americans' presence and as paying little attention to their advice. The liaison personnel freely admitted their own shortcomings, and by their reports suggested that patience was the most important quality for a liaison officer to cultivate when dealing with the Chinese.

Matsuyama ha spread his forces widely, over a near 60 mile sector, thus he would be unable to perform mobile operations and was gradually shifting to a defense of the Kaolikung mountain range by the 20th. This allowed the 53rd Army to continue their advance and the New 39th to retake Hemushu. By late May, with the 198th Division apparently contained on the north, Kurashige then rushed with the 113th Regiment to reinforce the Tiantouzhai front, where they successfully stopped the 53rd Army on its tracks. Yet on June 1st, the 54th Army, emerged in the Shweli valley from Ta-tang-tzu pass to join the 593rd Regiment from the Ma-mien pass. Next day the Chinese occupied Chieh-tou village and began patrolling the Shweli valley. They took the advice of Y Force officers and donned Burmese clothes. So disguised, they found it easy to enter Japanese-held villages. When taken by surprise, the Japanese were willing to abandon many of their outer defenses. With TNT charges dropped by the 27th Troop Carrier's C-47's when the weather cleared, the 198th Division also blew up the last pillboxes at Chai-kung-tang on June 13th. When the last shots had been fired and the Chinese farmer boys of the 54th Army reported the area secure, there was bewilderment at finding only 75 Japanese bodies in defenses that must have been manned by at least 300 men, and shock and nausea when the Japanese kitchens revealed how the defenders had been able to prolong their stay. Pitiful and ghastly evidence showed that the Japanese had resorted to cannibalism when their rations failed. On June 14th the Japanese further quit Chiao-tou-chieh, leaving many stores to the 2nd Reserve and 36th Divisions. In the end, the Kurashige Detachment would pull back to Watien while the Inose Battalion retreated towards Kutungchieh.

General Wei then ordered the 71st Army to cross the Salween, just below the Huitung Bridge to attack Longling while a containing force attacked the strong Japanese harrison at Lameng. 20,000 troops of the 71st would cross the river by June 5th. At this time the 76th division left a regiment to besiege Pinga while the bulk pushed on to attack Matsuyama’s HQ at Mangshi, while the 9th Division crossed the Salween, cutting off Pingda’s line of communication. On June 4th, the new 28th Division attacked Lameng and forced Major Kanemitsu Keijirous garrison to retreat into the Mount Song fortress where they would hold out for several months. While the New 28th held down Kanemitsu, the 87th Division continued towards Longling, joining up with the 88th on June 8th to begin a siege of the main Japanese position on the Yunnan front. The Japanese still held onto the Burma Road east of Lung-ling, but as of June 7th the 87th Division had covered about two thirds of the distance along the Burma Road from the river to Lung-ling. The Chinese had to deal with small Japanese tanks, which had some moral effect but failed to halt the Chinese advance. Indeed, the latter had been fairly swift, for the Chinese had surprised the Japanese, and had been able to ease their supply problems by the capture of some Japanese rice depots.

To meet the new crisis, Matsuyama dispatched the 1st battalion, 119th regiment to stop the 2nd army at Xiangdaxiang and then attack Longling from the south. Matsuyama ordered Colonel Matsui Hideji to immediately relieve Longling from the north; and for the Yamazaki Composite Group to keep the Mangshi-Longling road open. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Song Xilian, had been making some progress against Longling’s two outer heights, the stout defenders would manage to repel the uncoordinated Chinese assaults for about a week. Four days of un-coordinated infantry attacks, with little artillery support, failed to carry the three mountains inside Lung-ling, and there was nothing to show for the heavy drain on the 71st Army's ammunition stocks. This gave more time for Matsuyama’s reinforcements to arrive by June 14th. On the 15th Matsui launched a heavy attack, in coordination with the besieged defenders, successfully defeating the 71st Army and consequently driving the Chinese from the vicinity of Longling. The Japanese had thus been able to drive back 10000 Chinese effectives by an attack with only 1500.

Repeated attempts by American liaison personnel with the 71st Army to learn how a small Japanese garrison could drive back a Chinese army group only brought embarrassed smiles from Chinese officers. The Chinese finally related on June 25th that the 261st Regiment had bolted, and that the commanding general of the 87th Division had attempted suicide. When fuller details of the fighting around Longling were available, anger and annoyance spread from Y Force to the Generalissimo himself. Y Force personnel considered the Chinese decision to withdraw from Longling inexcusable because the 11th Army Group had sent forward no reinforcements to meet the initial Japanese counterattacks. Of 21 battalions in the Longling vicinity on June 14th, only 9 took part in the fighting. In describing the defensive attitude of the 259th Regiment, as an example of the conduct that had cost the chance of a speedy breakthrough into Burma, one American liaison officer wrote: "From the time that we crossed the river until we reached Longling, the regimental commander continually had his troops in the rear digging emplacements and trenches in the fear that they would have to retreat." Yet that is it for the Yunnan battle for now as we need to head over to the Kamaing area.

General Tanaka’s 18th Division were withdrawing with the 22nd and 38th division in hot pursuit. To the south the Seton Roadblock was being held by 112th Regiment, threatening to thwart Tanaka’s plans. Coming to their aid, General Sun sent his 113th and 114th Regiments to descend upon Lawa, where General Aida began an unauthorized retreat on June 4th. The abandonment of Lawa severely affected the defense of Kamaing, thus General Aida was relieved of command and replaced with Colonel Imaoka Soshiro. Colonel Shoshiro immediately began to dig in at Lagawng. Meanwhile the bulk of the 55th and 56th regiments were holding onto the Nanyaseik area as General Liao’s 65th regiment cut their withdrawal route off on June 1st. While the rest of the 22nd Division were applying pressure from the north, the heavily outnumbered Japanese had no choice but to quickly cut a trail southeast, finally withdrawing on june 7th. Their retreat was chaotic, both regiments lost contact with each other and with their subordinate units as they made separate ways towards Kamaing. It would only be the 3rd battalion, 56th regiment who would arrive at Kamaing by June 10th, most of the others would reach Lakatkawng in late june. While retreating, their artillery units were intercepted by the pursuing Chinese and the artillerymen chose to die with their guns.

While the 22nd Division and 149th Regiment thus pushed towards Kamaing, General Sun had also sent the 113th Regiment to take Zigyun and the 114th Regiment to advance southwards and support the Chindit assault on Mogaung. The Chinese were able to encircle Kamaing from the west, north and east as the 149th Regiment then moving across the fields and into Kamaing to take the settlement on June 16th, pushing Tanaka’s battle-weary troops to the hills south and west of Kamaing. Meanwhile Brigadier Calbert was able to reach the Mogaung area by the start of June. 12 miles from Mogaung, Calvert’s forward troops began to run into Japanese patrols and snipers. Despite taking losses, the 3/6th Gurkhas led by Colonel Claude Rome, who in his previous incarnation had been overlord of “Broadway,” pushed on, seizing the western heights overlooking Mogaung on May 31. On June 1st, Calvert’s South Staffords linked up with Rome and the Gurkhas at the village of Loihinche. Other elements of the brigade reached the southern foothills of the heights, three miles south of the town, on June 2 and went straight into the fray. That same day, the Lancashire Fusiliers and the South Staffords also attacked Lakum (held by some ordnance troops and a field hospital). The leading force of Fusiliers was soon pinned down by heavy fire, the impasse only broken when a Bren gunner in the leading rifle section went wild, and ran “straight up the hill, firing from the hip and screaming curses at the Japanese.” Softening up the Japanese with airstrikes from Air Commando Mustangs, troops of the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers and 1st South Staffordshires attacked and wrested Lakum village away from Japanese and occupied the summit of the range of hills overlooking the city, to the northwest.

Calvert decided he would need to build a base akin to White City, where he could collect supplies and build an airstrip to take out the wounded. Calvert fixed his eye on the village of Lakum, occupying a strategic spot on the eastern foothills of the heights overlooking the Mogaung plain. Upon capturing the village, the Chindits would also find substantial ammunition, a field hospital and buildings which had obviously hosted several Japanese headquarters. The country leading up to Lakum, however, was hard stuff. It was in the midst of thick jungle intersected by deep ravines. The path proved difficult to follow as it sometimes wound along a ridge and sometimes went straight up or straight down. The place was a defender’s paradise. “A handful of resolute men could hold successive hill-tops for hours against a large force such as ours overburdened with mules and heavy stores,”.

In response to the new threat, Colonel Okada Hakuji rushed over with some units of his 128th Regiment to protect Mogaung, leaving his 1st Battalion to face the rapidly-approaching 114th Regiment and immediately recalling his 3rd Battalion from Seton. Alongside this General Honda ordered General Takeda to turn back from Myitkyina and instead secure the Moguang-Kameing area. Thus the chance to lift the siege of Myitkyina was lost. By June 3rd, the Chindits had built a new airstrip near the Tapaw Ferry, allowing airdrops of supplies and equipment to spill in. Calvert was now ready to launch his attack.

Early on June 8th, the 1st South Staffords set off to secure the Pinhmi. The village was defended by elements of 3rd battalion, 128th regiment who were also protecting some ammunition dumps in the area. The Staffords routed the Japanese and destroyed the dumps, clearing the way to the bridge. By now it was afternoon, and they stepped aside to let the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers move on to capture the 150-foot-long bridge. All seemed well until a hail of gunfire shattered the silence, tearing into the Fusiliers. Two companies were pinned down in the ditch while another was in the jungle further down. At about 6 pm, Calvert arrived at the front to confer with Major David Monteith of the attacking company. It was decided that two platoons, under the cover of a mortar barrage would dash across the bridge and secure the other bank. Calvert’s mind went to the 4.2” mortars. He intended to use them to deadly effect now. Two platoons of Fusiliers moved in on the bridge, with one platoon attempting to move along the ditch, only to struggle against the thick, waist-high grass, as the second slipped off the road into the jungle. The mortars, about 60 yards behind them, began firing, slowly at first, but then as fast as the men could drop bombs into the tubes. The men, with fixed bayonets, charged across the bridge. The Japanese waited until the British were halfway across before opening fire. Tracers filled that little space, bullets tearing into flesh. The Chindits toppled left and right. Some crawled in their bellies, trying to get just far enough to throw their grenades upon the enemy positions. By 6.15, it was all over, the retreat was called. Calvert summoned US airstrikes. Mustangs swooped in, bombing and machine-gunning the enemy emplacements, but one Mustang mistakenly bombed a group of Fusiliers unloading mules.

Because of the unexpected opposition, Calvert would instead direct his forces to ford the Wettauk Chaung and take Mahaung and Ywathitgale, which successfully fell on June 9. The following morning, a Gurkha company attacked towards Kyaingyi and the railway to create the impression that the main attack would come from this direction while the bulk of the 3/6th Gurkhas made a wide right flank advance to attack the bridge from the rear. At dawn on the 10th, Shaw’s Gurkhas moved forward, waist deep in marsh water and mud. The bridge assault party was under the command of Captain Michael Allmand, a one-time cavalryman commissioned into the Indian Army in 1942 after escaping from Singapore. Allmand moved his men forward warily. The approaches to the bridge were narrow with the road up on a high embankment with swampy, tree-heavy low-ground flanking both sides. Coming in from the marsh, the Gurkhas set upon the bunkers at the bridge with grenades and small-arms fire, but the Japanese held their ground. At 10 am, they tried again, shooting and hurling grenades from amid waist-deep mud of the Wettauk. Allmand, who was close to shore charged. Throwing grenades to scatter the enemy, he closed in to kill three with his kukri. Rallied by his heroism, the Gurkhas rushed the remaining defenders, capturing the bridge. About 35 Japanese were killed at the bridge and the Gurkhas captured one medium machinegun and two light machineguns. In return, Chindit casualties in the encirclement and capture of the Pinhmi Bridge came to about 130 killed and wounded. By mid-afternoon, Calvert had deployed two battalions up on the Mogaung-Pinhmi Road, while a third occupied the bridge area. Conquering the brigade saw the Chindits suffer 130 casualties, while Okada’s troops had also suffered heavy casualties, yet they had successfully delayed the Chindit advance for four days, which allowed Takeda to bring the bulk of his forces back into Mogaung.

Knowing full well that the Japanese had been able to reinforce Mogaung, Calvert decided to wait for the arrival of the Chinese troops that Stilwell had sent to reinforce him; but in the meantime, he launched a successful attack against the courthouse on June 11, followed by a failed advance towards the river. To secure his right flank, Calvert had decided to send a company of South Staffords under a new replacement officer, Major “Archie” Wavell Jr, son of the venerable Viceroy, to secure the area between the road and the Mogaung River. The Staffords made good headway, but near the river, they came under heavy fire from entrenched Japanese. Wavell was hit in the wrist, the bullet almost taking the hand off; and he was then pulled out of the line and walked back to the field hospital near Gurkha village, clutching onto his hand, which was now hanging on by a sinew. That night, the surgeons at Gurkha Village were to remove the hand entirely. Wavell Jr’s war was over. In the end, the Staffords also had to pull back towards the road after the loss of their commanding officer. By June 15th, the Chinese had still not appeared, thus the Chindits ultimately had to withdraw to Pinhmi.

Back over at Myitkyina artillery was arriving by air. Two batteries plus one platoon of 75-mm. howitzers; two 105-mm., and two 155-mm. howitzers, were landed. All except two pieces with GALAHAD were kept under headquarters control. During the siege they fired 600 tons of ammunition, very rarely with massed fire. Boatner renewed his offensive on June 13th, sending almost all his forces to attack the town from all directions. The American-Chinese forces would struggle to make much progress against General Minakami’s defenses. Utilizing a system of night attack and daylight defense, heavy casualties were consequently inflicted on the enemy and large supplies of weapons and ammunition were captured and used in the defense of the city. On June 12th the Japanese hit a platoon of K Company, New GALAHAD, so hard that the company broke and re-formed on the L Company line. The portion of the Japanese thrust that hit the perimeter next to the river made most of the men "take off," but two stayed in place and repelled the Japanese with an automatic rifle and a machine gun. To the west of this little break the Japanese worked their way in close but were stopped by grenades and small arms fire.

As a result of the attacks, however, the 3rd Galahad Battalion had cut the Maingna ferry road and reached the Irrawaddy north of Myitkyina by June 17th, with the 150th and 88th Regiments also gaining up to 200 yards. The allies needed to capture the Myitkyina-Mogaung-Sumprabum road junction; but for such few gains, Boatner had lost many men and thus had to stop his attacks on June 18th. Stilwell ordered the end of all infantry attacks. Boatner replied that he would stop attacking Japanese positions until ". . . our troops are steadied and a favorable opportunity presents itself." There was reason for the troops to need steadying. A and B companies, 209th Engineers, were cut off from their main body by infiltrating Japanese. Trying to close in on them, Company C and Headquarters and Service Companies were in turn halted by Japanese. The condition of A and B Companies became critical during June 14th, for they had only one meal with them. Two of their men managed to work their way back to the block on the Sumprabum Road with news of their plight, but enemy small arms fire prevented airdrops. The isolated companies finally made their way back in small groups to the rest of the battalion over 15 and 16 June. The 3rd Battalion of GALAHAD reported trouble in effecting reorganization and enforcing orders. The Americans were not alone in their problems. Two companies of the Chinese 2/42nd which had made a small penetration into the Japanese lines on 14 June were wiped out by counterattack that night. These setbacks emphasized the nature of the Myitkyina fighting. The Allies held a ring of battalion and regimental strongpoints enclosing a similar Japanese system. Though the Allied strongpoints were close enough for the troops in one to sortie to the aid of another should that be needed, they were not so close that interlocking fire could be put down to close the gaps. Consequently, there was plenty of room for maneuver and ambush, and the inexperienced engineers and New GALAHAD troops often suffered at the hands of General Minakami's veterans. On the other hand, the Myitkyina Garrison did not emerge entirely unscathed, as they too suffered heavily, losing approximately 1000 men during the month of June alone. But that is all for today with the CBI theater as we now need to head over to New Guinea to start the Battle of Lone Tree Hill.

After the fall of Wakde, General Tagami had sent Colonel Yoshino Naoyasu’s 223rd Regiment to cross the Tor River inland to attack Arare while Colonel Matsuyama Soemon’s 224th Regiment attacked the Toem area from the other side. In the meantime, General Doe’s 163rd Regiment patrolled across Tementoe Creek and the Tor River, encountering heavy Japanese resistance at Maffin but successfully repelling some enemy counterattacks. While the 163rd strengthened its defenses on the Tor and at Arare, Doe would also see the arrival of Colonel Prugh Herndon’s 158th Regiment on May 21. General Krueger’s plan was to use this regiment in a vigorous overland drive toward Sarmi, aimed at throwing the enemy into the defensive and therefore securing the Wakde area. This decision was based upon scanty and incomplete information concerning Japanese strength and dispositions. The Japanese had no intention of abandoning Sarmi and the two airstrips between the town and the Tor without a desperate struggle.

The Americans were also finalizing their plans for an operation against Biak, codenamed Hurricane. General Fuller’s plan was to land the 186th Regiment in the Bosnek area at 7:45 on May 27th to secure the Green Beaches and its two jetties. Once the two jetties were secured, LCI's bearing the 162nd Infantry, supporting troops, and the task force reserve were to move inshore and unload. LST's were also to move to the jetties when the beach area surrounding them had been cleared by the 186th Infantry. LCM's bearing artillery, tanks, and engineering equipment were to move to the beaches as soon as channels through the coral were found or made, or to the jetties in waves following the 186th Infantry's assault companies. As soon as it reorganized ashore, the 162nd Infantry was to advance rapidly west along the coast from Bosnek to seize the three airdromes. This drive was to be supported by eight tanks of the 603rd Tank Company and the 146th Field Artillery Battalion. The fields were to be repaired quickly to accommodate one fighter group and then expanded to receive an additional fighter group, a heavy bomber group, a reconnaissance group, a night fighter squadron, and one photo reconnaissance squadron. Mokmer Drome was to be the first field developed. Brigadier-General Edwin Patrick would also replace Doe in command of the Tornado Task Force, as the latter would resume its duties as assistant commander of the 41st Division.

Admiral Fechteler’s Task Force 77 was to provide naval support and cover the assault shipping. Naval fire support was to begin at H minus 45 minutes, 6:30. From that time until H Hour, cruisers and destroyers were to expend 400 rounds of 8-inch, 1,000 rounds of 6-inch, 3,740 rounds of 5-inch, and 1,000 rounds of 4.7-inch ammunition on targets in the airfield area west of the landing beaches. After H Hour the cruisers were to continue intermittent fire on the airfields, bombard targets of opportunity, and respond to calls for support from the forces ashore. Because there were many known or suspected Japanese gun emplacements along the south shore of Biak, counterbattery fire was to take precedence over all other types of fire. Bombardment of the landing beaches was also to begin at H minus 45 minutes. Five destroyers were to bombard the beaches and adjacent areas until H minus 30 minutes, when they were to move westward to join the cruisers firing on the airfield area. Then four other destroyers were to continue beach bombardment until H minus 3 minutes. Total ammunition allowance for beach bombardment was 4,900 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch shells, while 40-mm. and 20-mm. ammunition was to be expended at the discretion of individual ship commanders. Rocket and automatic weapons fire from three rocket-equipped LCI's and two SC's was to provide close support for the assault waves. This fire was to begin at H minus 5 minutes and was to last until H Hour or until the initial wave was safely ashore.

Meanwhile General Kenney would toss 52 B-24’s to bomb the beaches just before the landings. Additionally, medium bombers and fighters from 5th Air Force would cover the force from the air; and from May 17th onwards, the bombings on Biak’s airfields would increase sharply in violence to soften up its defenses. As elsewhere along the absolute defense zone perimeter, primary emphasis was laid upon the construction of airfields. Between December 1943 and the enemy invasion of Hollandia in April 1944, two of three projected fields on southern Biak were completed and put into operational use by planes of the Navy's 23rd Air Flotilla. Their usefulness ended almost immediately, however, when the enemy's vastly superior air forces began operating from Hollandia bases. As in the Wakde-Sarmi sector, the concentration of effort on airfield construction until the Hollandia invasion resulted in dangerously delaying the preparation of ground defenses against enemy amphibious attack. In the five weeks which elapsed between the Hollandia and Biak invasions, the Biak garrison forces, under able leadership and by dint of desperate effort, succeeded in organizing a system of strong cave positions, which proved highly effective after the enemy landing. However, time, equipment and manpower were so short that defensive preparations could not entirely be completed. Some 15-cm naval guns, brought to Biak immediately after the Hollandia invasion to strengthen the coast defenses, were still unmounted when the island was attacked.

On May 23rd, the 158th advanced west from the Tor River Bridgehead. The advance of Company L met increasingly strong resistance. Japanese defenses were centered around three small, brush-bordered lakes near the beach about 1,800 yards west of the Tor. The rest of the 3rd Battalion, 158th Infantry, across the Tor before 1130, quickly moved forward to assist Company L, which had been pinned down along the main coastal track west of the lakes by Japanese machine gun and rifle fire. Company K pushed up to the left flank of Company L, while Company I moved toward L's rear. With the aid of mortar fire from the 81-mm. weapons of Company M, Companies K and L were able to push gradually forward during the afternoon, advancing on a front about 400 yards wide. Finding that the attack was not progressing as rapidly as he had expected, Colonel Herndon ordered his 1st Battalion across the Tor. The 1st Battalion did not start moving until 1400 and could not get far enough forward to join the attack before dark. Tanks would probably have been of great help to the 3rd Battalion, but by the time the mediums of the 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, moved across the Tor, the forward infantry troops had already halted for the night. In the end, Companies L and K would dig in for the night across the main coastal track about 400 yards east of Maffin.

The following morning, after an ineffective mortar and artillery bombardment, Herndon resumed the attack. Despite the lack of extended artillery support, Companies K and L moved out as planned at 7:30. Company L, on the right, advanced along the beach encountering only scattered rifle fire but Company K, on the main road, had hardly started when Japanese machine gun and rifle fire from concealed positions in a wooded area on the left front halted its advance. Unable to gain any ground, Company K called for tank support. Two tanks, together with a flamethrower detachment from Company B of the 27th Engineers, arrived at Company K's lines about 1000. With the flamethrowers and tanks blasting the way, the infantrymen overran the Japanese defenses, killing ten of the enemy and capturing two machine guns. The remainder of the Japanese force, probably originally some forty men strong, disappeared into the jungle south of the road, whence scattered rifle fire continued to harass Company K. Company L reached the outskirts of Maffin No. 1 about 1400. The movement had been slow, not as a result of Japanese opposition but because the battalion commander did not believe it prudent for Company L to advance far beyond Company K. Despite the return of two companies, most of Colonel Kato’s engineers would have to withdraw behind the Tirfoam River against such heavy firepower. Captain Saito’s reconnaissance unit, meanwhile, retreated to the jungles south of Maffin alongside one engineer company, which was under Kato himself.

Over the Tirfoam River, however, the Americans were again stopped by the tenacious engineers, which again forced Herndon to request tank support. As the tanks moved into position elements of the Right Sector Force, comprising Captain Saito's men of the 1st Battalion, 224th Infantry and an engineer company, charged out of the jungle. The Japanese were under Colonel Kato, Right Sector Force commander, who was killed as he personally led a small detachment against the American tanks. The enemy was quickly thrown back with heavy losses by the combined fire of the four tanks and Company L's riflemen and machine gunners. However, under cover of their infantry attack, the Japanese had dragged a 37-mm. anti-tank gun forward out of the jungle. As the enemy infantrymen withdrew to the southwest after the death of Colonel Kato, the anti-tank gun opened fire. It was soon destroyed and its crew killed, but not before three of the American tanks had been so damaged that they had to be withdrawn for repairs.

Facing such heavy resistance, Herndon then sent his 1st Battalion to carry out a deep envelopment to the south across the Tirfoam, yet these troops would similarly be unable to break through by nightfall. After killing 28 men and wounded 75 others, Kato’s force allowed Tagami to dispatch the 2nd Battalion, 223rd Regiment to reinforce the Ilier Mountains line. On the morning of May 25, Major Matsuoka Yasake also arrived there with an infantry company to assume command of the remainder of Kato’s forces. Meanwnhile Yoshino had crossed the Tor River, 3 days behind schedule and to the east, Matsyuama was assembling on the right bank of the Tementoe River. Herndon relieved his 1st Battalion with the 3rd and then pushed west with the 2nd Battalion following behind them. The next objective for the 158th was Long Tree Hill.

Lone Tree Hill, known to the Japanese as Mt. Ilier, had been named for a single tree which was depicted on its crest by the map then employed by the Americans. Actually, the hill's coral mass was covered with dense rainforest and jungle undergrowth. Lone Tree Hill was about 175 feet high, 1200 yards long north to south, and 1100 yards wide east to west. The north side dropped steeply to a rocky shore on Maffin Bay. The hill's eastern slope was fronted by a short, violently twisting stream which was promptly dubbed the "Snaky River" by the 158th Regiment. The main road curved away from the beach to pass south of the Snaky River and Lone Tree Hill through a narrow defile. The southern side of this defile was formed by two noses of Mt. Saksin , a terrain feature about 100 feet higher than Lone Tree Hill. The more westerly of these noses was named "Hill 225", known to the Japanese as Mt. Sento after its height in feet. No name was given to the eastern ridge line, which pointed toward Lone Tree Hill from the southeast. There was a small native village at the eastern entrance to the defile and another at the pass's western outlet. Mt. Saksin was a name given to an indefinitely outlined hill mass which forms the northern extremity of the Irier Mountains, extending inland from the coast at Lone Tree Hill. The name Saksin was specifically applied to a prominent peak about 2,000 yards due south of Lone Tree. On or about May 23rd General Tagami had moved his headquarters into the Mt. Saksin area, apparently on the southwest side of the central peak.

Herndon forces continued the advance through the abandoned enemy positions, albeit without tank support, for they could not cross the fragile Tirfoam bridge. In the afternoon, the Americans were finally halted below the southernmost bend of the Snaky River, subjected to heavy machine-gun fire and an intermittent artillery bombardment. General Patrick, who had succeeded to the command of the TORNADO Task Force during the morning, was informed of the opposition encountered by the 1st Battalion. He ordered the advance stopped for the night and instructed the 158th Infantry to remain well east of the Snaky River so that American artillery could register on the native village and the defile without endangering the forward troops. Harassed by a few artillery shells, which by now had been recognized as originating from Japanese 70-mm. or 75-mm. weapons, the 1st Battalion pulled back about 500 yards east of the Snaky. A perimeter was set up with the battalion's left resting on the road and its right on the beach. The 2nd Battalion established a series of company perimeters back along the road to the east. Casualties for the day had been 22 men killed and 26 wounded, almost all in the 1st Battalion, while about 50 Japanese had been killed. When the attack orders for the day had been issued, it had been hoped that the 1st Battalion could reach the top of Lone Tree Hill before nightfall. Since the unexpectedly strong enemy opposition had prevented the realization of this hope, plans were made to continue the advance westward on the 26th. The ultimate objective was the east bank of the Woske River, 2,000 yards west of Lone Tree Hill, and the intermediate objective was the native village at the eastern entrance to the defile. The advance was to be preceded by naval shelling of the northern slopes of Lone Tree Hill from 6:30 to 7:00. A fifteen-minute artillery preparation was also to precede the advance, and the infantry was to start moving at 8:45.

The next morning, naval fire started ten minutes late. Two destroyers lying offshore shelled the northern slopes of Lone Tree Hill and the Maffin Bay area, firing on known or suspected enemy defensive positions and assembly points. After a twenty-minute bombardment the two support vessels withdrew. Artillery fire did not begin until 8:30. The time lag gave the Japanese ample opportunity to prepare for the infantry attack which had been heralded by the destroyer fire. The artillery, aiming its shells into the defile and against the eastern slopes of Lone Tree Hill, ceased firing about 8:45. A few moments later the 1st Battalion, 158th Infantry, Company B again leading, started moving westward. The infantry's line of departure was nearly 1,000 yards east of the village at the southeast foot of Lone Tree Hill, and the advance had to be slow because the road ran through heavily jungled terrain. The enemy therefore had sufficient time to reoccupy positions in the defile and on Lone Tree Hill which might have been vacated during the American artillery barrage. The value of both the naval and artillery bombardment had been lost.

Herndon’s 1st Battalion moved once again against Lone Tree Hill. Company B moved forward to the point at which it had been held up the previous afternoon and was again stopped--this time by fire from the southeastern corner of Lone Tree Hill. Company D's heavy machine guns were brought up to spray a densely wooded area in front of the point rifle platoon. The fire dispersed the Japanese riflemen, and Company B moved forward again. Less than 100 yards of ground had been gained when the company again encountered machine gun and mortar fire originating in the native village. Company A, initially off the road to the right rear of Company B, turned north to the mouth of the Snaky River. One platoon crossed at the river mouth at 1030 but was quickly forced back to the east bank by Japanese machine gun fire from the rocky beach below the north face of Lone Tree Hill. Artillery support was called for, supplied, and proved successful in stopping the enemy fire, and about 1:50 all Company A crossed the Snaky. Orders were to move down the west side of that stream to establish contact with Company B and to send one platoon up the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill to probe enemy positions. Other efforts were meanwhile being made to scatter the Japanese opposing Company B. Company E moved up to the left flank of Company B and on the south side of the main road. The combined efforts of the two rifle companies proved insufficient to dislodge the Japanese from their positions at the eastern entrance to the defile, and the enemy fire forced the American units to seek cover. Company F was therefore ordered to pass through B's left flank and proceed to Hill 225 to take the Japanese positions from the rear. Company F's attack could not be started before dark and Company A, moving up the west side of the Snaky, was unable to relieve much of the pressure on Company B. Finally, Company A was forced for a second time to withdraw to the east bank of the river as a result of enemy fire from Lone Tree Hill. Tanks would have been of great help to Company B, but the bridge over the Tirfoam could not bear their weight, and the road west of the stream was in such disrepair that tanks probably could not have negotiated it.

Only Company A would manage to cross the Snaky River through much effort, yet it would be unable to relieve the pressure from Company B’s front and would have to retreat by the end of the day. To prevent further casualties from being inflicted by Japanese patrols, which were expected to roam around the flanks of the forward elements during the night, a semicircular perimeter was ultimately established. Although Herndon’s attacks on May 26th had been completely unsuccessful, the 158th Regiment had located and probed some of the principal Japanese defenses in the area and could now be ready to launch a more effective assault.

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General Vinegar Joe was experiencing some major setbacks, but it looked like Myitkyina was as good as his. However the American officers' reports of how difficult the going was for the Chinese was quite disheartening. Over in New Guinea, the allies were yet again faced with a great obstacle, now in the form of One Tree Hill.